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1984] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
isfy the requirement of a fair trial without sacrificing the interest
of society in upholding valid convictions.
Vincent Toomey
Torts-Recovery allowed for psychic injury resulting from obser-
vation of serious injury to family member if plaintiff in zone of
danger
Over 50 years ago, Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo defined the
limits of tortfeasor liability in New York by stating that the "risk
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed."' 3 This
rule has been used to justify recoveries by plaintiffs who have suf-
fered psychic injury as a result of being in physical peril them-
selves, 4 yet New York Courts have been reluctant to extend pro-
defendant's decision to plead, but that information was not subject to mandatory disclosure
under Brady and Agurs. 44 N.Y.2d at 79-80, 375 N.E.2d at 43, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 87; see also
People v. Ausserau, 77 App. Div. 2d 152, 156, 432 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943 (4th Dep't 1980) (" 'If
there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the additional evidence is consid-
ered, there is no justification for a new trial' ") (quoting Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-13).
173 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). In Palsgraf,
a woman standing on a railroad platform was injured by a set of scales that was knocked
over by the force of an explosion many feet away. Id. at 341, 162 N.E. at 99. The explosion
occurred when a package of explosives was knocked from a passenger's arms as he jumped
aboard a moving train. Id. at 340-41, 162 N.E. at 99. Chief Justice Cardozo reasoned that,
since the plaintiff was in no foreseeable physical peril herself, there was no duty owed to
her. Id. at 342, 162 N.E. at 101.
Dean Prosser has described Palsgraf as "something of a bombshell" in foresaking proxi-
mate cause and redefining the issue of foreseeability in terms of duty. W. PROSSER & W.
KEETrON, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43, at 284 (5th ed. 1983). Indeed, the case has
been written on extensively. See, e.g., Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a
Negligent Act, 39 YALE L.J. 449, 449 (1930); James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47
NEV. U.L. REV. 778, (1953); Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MCH. L. REV. 1, (1953). The
New York courts often return to the Palsgraf doctrine in discussing tort liability. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Reed-Prentice, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 483, 403 N.E.2d 440, 445, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 723
(1980) (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting) (law of negligence phrased by Cardozo is "right on tar-
get"); Havas v. Victory Paper Stock Co., 49 N.Y.2d 381, 385-86, 402 N.E.2d 1136, 1138, 426
N.Y.S.2d 233, 236 (1980) (answers to traditional negligence problems still found in principle
formulated by Cardozo); Pulka v. Edelnan, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 785, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1022, 390
N.Y.S.2d 393, 396 (1976) (principle expressed in Palsgraf determines scope of duty).
17, See, e.g., Battalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 239-40, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d
34, 35-36 (1961). Prior to Battalla New York required that there be some physical impact
preceding recovery for psychic harm. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 107, 109-
10, 45 N.E. 354, 354-55 (1896). In Battalla, the infant plaintiff was placed in defendant's
chair lift by an employee of the defendant who failed to secure the strap intended to protect
the occupant. 10 N.Y.2d at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35. As a result of the
employee's negligence, the infant became hysterical and suffered physical and mental inju-
ries. Id. The Battalla Court, overruling Mitchell, held that a cause of action will lie for
negligently caused "severe emotional and neurological disturbances with residual physical
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tection to those who suffer emotional trauma 17 5 as a proximate
result of witnessing the injury or death of another.1 6 Recently,
manifestations." Id. at 239, 176 N.E.2d at 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d at 35.
The Court of Appeals has reaffirmed Battalla by holding that an individual can recover
for psychic injuries resulting from another's negligence even in the absence of physical im-
pact as long as the party seeking recovery was subjected to the fear of physical injury. See
Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 111, 366 N.E.2d 64, 65, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 364-65 (1977).
It has also been held that occupants of a residence could recover against the state for the
mental disturbance or fright that resulted from a "no-knock" search warrant negligently
obtained by the state police even though it was unaccompanied by physical impact. Herman
v. State of New York, 78 Misc. 2d 1025, 1031-32, 357 N.Y.S.2d 811, 817 (Ct. Cl. 1974); see
also Blair v. Union Free School Dist. No. 6, 67 Misc. 2d 248, 248-49, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 223
(Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1971) (law is unequivocal that action can lie for mental and physi-
cal injuries negligently induced).
175 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comments j, k (1965). The type of mental
distress considered by the Restatement is the type that is so severe that no reasonable man
could observe such an incident without succumbing to stress-related bodily harm. Id. More-
over, this emotional disturbance must be serious and verifiable. Id. It is left to the courts to
separate serious mental disorders from trifling and frivolous ones, Note, Torts-Expanding
the Concept of Recovery for Mental and Emotional Injury, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 176, 186
(1974), yet it is clear that what is required is something more than mere grief or mental
anguish, Comment, The Development of Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress
Arising From Peril or Injury to Another: An Analysis of the American and Australian
Approaches, 26 EMORY L.J. 647, 647 n.4 (1977). Indeed, a wide range of disturbances rang-
ing from ulcers to death often result from severe mental shock. Smith, Relation of Emotions
to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30 VA. L. REV. 193, 222-26
(1944). For a discussion of sudden stress induced disease, see Selzer, Psychological Stress
and Legal Concepts of Disease Causation, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 951 (1971).
176 Comment, An Expanding Legal Duty: The Recovery of Damages for Mental
Anguish by Those Observing Tortious Activity, 19 AM. Bus. L.J. 214, 215 n.3. (1981). The
reason underlying the denial of recovery for mental distress is that no duty has been found
running from the negligent defendant to the bystander who suffers psychic injury. See Ken-
nedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 506, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1335, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424
(1983). In the leading New York case, Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419,
301 N.Y.S.2d 554 (1969), a mother outside the zone of danger was denied recovery for
mental and resulting physical injuries caused by the shock of witnessing an automobile acci-
dent in which her 2-year old child was seriously injured. Id. at 611, 249 N.E.2d at 419-20,
301 N.Y.S.2d at 555. The Tobin Court held recovery would be barred whether or not the
bystander was an eyewitness and regardless of the relationship between the victim and the
bystander. Id. This is consistent with other New York cases denying recovery to wives for
harm sustained solely as a result of the negligently sustained injuries of their husbands. See,
e.g., Bessette v. St. Peter's Hosp., 51 App. Div. 2d 286, 287, 381 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (3d Dep't
1976) (wife witnessed husband's suffering and eventual amputation of limb resulting from
medical malpractice); Smith v. Incorporated Village of Plandome, 28 Misc. 2d 793, 794, 213
N.Y.S.2d 119, 120 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961) (wife arrived at scene of fire and told of
husband's injury). Recovery has also been denied to parents for psychic harm caused as a
result of injury to their children. See, e.g., Quijije v. Lutheran Medical Center, 92 App. Div.
2d 935, 935, 460 N.Y.S.2d 600, 600-01 (2d Dep't 1983) (mother barred from recovering for
emotional harm caused solely from observing baby suffer and die); Aquilio v. Nelson, 78
App. Div. 2d 195, 199, 434 N.Y.S.2d 520, 523 (4th Dep't 1980) (mother's injury caused by
death of child too remote to be compensable); Berg v. Baum, 224 N.Y.S.2d 974, 975 (Sup.
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however, in Bovsun v. Sanperi,177 the Court of Appeals held that
an action lies for emotional injury caused by the contemporaneous
observation of the serious physical injury or death of an immediate
family member, provided the plaintiff was himself subject to an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm. 178 In Bovsun, the plaintiffs, a
mother and daughter, were sitting in a station wagon that Jack
Bovsun, the husband and father, had stopped on the side of a
parkway because of mechanical difficulties. 179 Mr. Bovsun was at
the rear of the station wagon when he and his vehicle were struck
by a car negligently driven by the defendant. 80 Although his wife
and daughter were only slightly injured and were not situated so as
to witness the impact, they were both instantly aware of Mr. Bov-
sun's more serious injuries.' In Kugel v. Mid-Westchester Indus-
trial Park, Inc., s2 the companion case to Bovsun, a car in which
the plaintiffs and their two children were riding was hit by a reck-
lessly driven vehicle.18 3 All the occupants of the car were injured,
Ct. Rockland County 1962) (parents of infant have no cause of action based on fright in-
duced while witnessing accident). Similarly, siblings have been barred from recovery. See
Shaner v. Greece Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 51 App. Div. 2d 662, 663, 378 N.Y.S.2d 185, 187
(4th Dep't 1976) (barring sister who discovered body of brother but did not witness suicide).
The reluctance to extend legal protection to plaintiff bystanders stems from a tradi-
tional judicial hesitancy to protect psychic injuries. McNiece, Psychic Injury and Tort Lia-
bility in New York, 24 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 9 (1949); Comment, Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress: Liability to the Bystander, 11 GONZAGA L. REV. 203, 203 (1975); see
also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV.
1033, 1035 (1936). Early New York cases denied recovery in actions based solely on psychic
injury. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 107, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896) (fright alone
cannot support an action for damages). An analysis of New York case law reveals three
distinct lines of cases: those that allowed recovery for emotional harm when a duty already
owed directly to the plaintiff had been breached; those that denied liability for injuries
caused by shock and fear as a result of witnessing injury to another; and those that denied
recovery when a duty to the plaintiff had been violated and there was physical injury to a
third party that resulted in the plaintiff suffering an emotional injury. See Kennedy v. Mc-
Kesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 504-06, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1334-35, 462 N.Y.S.2d 421, 423-24
(1983).
177 61 N.Y.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
178 Id. at 233, 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
17 Id. at 224, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
180 Id. At the time of impact, Mrs. Selma Bovsun was seated in the front passenger seat
and the Bovsun's daughter, Mara Beth, was in the rear seat. Id.
181 Id. at 224-25, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358. Mrs. Bovsun and her daughter
were thrown about the interior of the wagon. Id. at 224, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at
358.
,82 61 N.Y.S.2d 219, 461 N.E.2d 843, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1984).
1083 Id. at 225-26, 461 N.E.2d at 845, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 359. Plaintiff Lawrence Kugel was
driving the vehicle. Id. at 225, 461 N.E.2d at 845, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 359. His wife, Lydia, was
seated in the front passenger seat with their 1-year old daughter, Stephanie, on her lap. Id.
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and one died soon after the accident as a result of her injuries."""
In separate actions, suit was brought against the negligent
drivers seeking compensation for, inter alia, the emotional trauma
caused by witnessing injuries to immediate family members. 185 The
trial courts in both actions dismissed the emotional distress claims,
ruling that no legally recognized cause of action had been al-
leged.18 6 Both cases were separately appealed and affirmed by the
Appellate Division, Second Department. 18 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals consolidated the actions and
reversed, 188 holding that if the defendants' negligent conduct had
exposed the plaintiffs to an unreasonable risk of physical injury,
recovery for injuries suffered as a result of the contemporaneous
observation of serious harm to an immediate family member was a
proper element of damages. 8 9 Writing for the majority, 90 Judge
Their 4-year old daughter, also a plaintiff, also was seated in the car. Id.
'8' Id. at 226, 461 N.E.2d at 845, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 359. Lydia Kugel broke her clavicle in
the collision, Lawrence Kugel broke his finger, and Karen, their 4-year old daughter, suf-
fered abdominal injuries. Id. The 1-year old daughter sustained several severe injuries that
caused her death several hours later. Id.
'85 Id. at 224, 461 N.E.2d at 844, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358. In both cases, lower courts dis-
posed of the actions on procedural grounds and therefore detailed factual records were not
developed. Id. at 225 n.1, 461 N.E.2d at 844 n.1, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 358 n.1.
,86 Id. at 225-27, 461 N.E.2d at 845-46, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 359-60.
117 See Bovsun v. Sanperi, 94 App. Div. 2d 711, 711, 462 N.Y.S.2d 611, 611 (2d Dep't
1983); Kugel v. Mid-Westchester Indus. Park, 90 App. Div. 2d 496, 496, 454 N.Y.S.2d 750,
751 (2d Dep't 1982).
'88 Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 234, 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
]89 Id. at 230-31, 461 N.E.2d at 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362. The Court noted that the zone
of danger approach is the majority rule. Id. at 228-29, 461 N.E.2d at 847, 473 N.Y.S.2d at
361 (citing Note, Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in
California and Other States, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1248, 1252 (1974); Note, Duty, Foreseeabil-
ity, and the Negligent Infliction of Mental Distress, 33 ME. L. REV. 303, 305 (1981)); see
also Comment, Portee v. Jaffee: Dillon Comes to New Jersey, 33 RUTGERS L. REv. 1171,
1172 (1981); Comment, Dillon v. Legg: Extension of Tort Liability in the Field of Mental
Distress, 4 U.S.F.L. REv. 116, 120 (1969). The zone of danger approach has also been
adopted by the American Law Institute as the preferred rule. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF
ToRTs § 313(2) comment d (1965). Nevertheless, the draftsmen recommended the zone of
danger approach reluctantly. See Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 563, 380 N.E.2d
1295, 1300 (1978). See generally Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314, 317-18 (D. Colo.
1965) (under Federal Tort Claims Act plaintiff can recover for shock with resulting injuries
if within zone of danger); Maryland v. Thomas, 173 F. Supp. 568, 573 (D. Md. 1959) (hus-
band could recover for fear for safety of his family in same automobile accident); Keck v.
Jackson, 122 Ariz. 114, 115, 593 P.2d 668, 669-70 (1979) (son can recover for trauma of
seeing mother injured in accident in which son also involved).
A number of cases have denied recovery when the plaintiff was not in the zone of dan-
ger. See, e.g., Whetham v. Bismarck Hosp., 197 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1972) (recovery for
shock from witnessing family member allowed if plaintiff located in zone of danger);
Guilmette v. Alexander, 128 Vt. 116, 120, 259 A.2d 12, 15 (1969) (mother not in zone of
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Jones noted that denying recovery to a fores'eeable bystander
merely because unlimited liability might result was no longer
valid. 191 Instead, the Court adopted a zone of danger rule reasoning
that the risk of unlimited liability was effectively circumscribed
through the use of this objective test.' 9 The Court rejected any
contention that the zone of danger rule was susceptible to fraud
and observed that, in any event, fear of fraud or of a proliferation
of claims was not a valid basis on which to deny all claims. 193 The
Court concluded that its decision was consistent with prior case
law' 94and, therefore, did not create a new cause of action. 195
danger may not for recover for shock caused from viewing daughter injured); Waube v. War-
rington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935) (mother died from shock after seeing
daughter run over-no recovery unless in zone of danger).
190 The majority opinion, written by Judge Jones, was joined by Chief Judge Cooke and
Judges Jasen and Meyer.
19, 61 N.Y.2d at 231, 461 N.E.2d at 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 363 (citing Battalla v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 240, 176 N.E.2d 729, 730, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (1961)).
192 Id. at 230, 461 N.E.2d at 848, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
193 Id. at 231, 461 N.E.2d at 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 363. Even before emotional distress
had been recognized as a legitimate cause of action, virtually all jurisdictions had rejected
the denial of entire classes of cases based solely on the threat of fraud. See, e.g., Immer v.
Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 493, 267 A.2d 481, 487 (1970) (interspousal tort immunity); Rozell v.
Rozell, 281 N.Y. 106, 109, 22 N.E.2d 254, 255 (1939) (siblings). It has been asserted that the
possibility of fraudulent claims, standing alone, cannot justify the denial of recovery. See
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 561, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1299 (1978). According to
Dean Prosser, "[i]t is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the
expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of
any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will give the court too much work
to do." Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV.
874, 877 (1939). The New York Court of Appeals has previously rejected the fear of a
"proliferation of claims" as a ground for denying a cause of action. Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969) (dictum).
' 61 N.Y.2d at 232, 461 N.E.2d at 849, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 363. The Court gave four
examples of cases consistent with the Bovsun decision in which recovery was denied because
the plaintiff was outside the zone of danger. Id. In Lafferty v. Manhasset Medical Center
Hosp., 54 N.Y.2d 277, 429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981), a woman was denied recov-
ery for the emotional distress resulting from the negligent administration of a blood transfu-
sion to her mother-in-law. Id. at 279-80, 429 N.E.2d at 790-91, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 112-13.
The case of Vaccaro v. Squibb Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 809, 418 N.E.2d 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d 871
(1980), involved a plaintiff mother who claimed emotional and psychic harm as a result of
the birth of her child who was allegedly deformed because of a drug administered to her by
the defendant hospital. Id. at 811, 418 N.E.2d at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871 (Fuchsberg, J.,
dissenting). The Appellate Division, First Department, held that the mother was owed a
duty because she was the doctor's patient and had herself ingested the drug, 71 App. Div. 2d
270, 277, 422 N.Y.S.2d 679, 683 (1st Dep't 1979), while the father was owed no duty because
he was not in any physical danger, id. at 278, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 684. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that even the mother was owed no duty. 52 N.Y.2d at 810-11, 418 N.E.2d
at 386, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 871.
In Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), the
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In a dissenting opinion, 196 Judge Kaye asserted that the ma-
jority's holding was a departure from precedent and had, in fact,
imposed a new duty upon tortfeasors"'9 Judge Kaye suggested
that since crucial determinations in such cases are within the prov-
ince of the jury, courts will almost never be able to dismiss such
actions before trial. 19 This new duty, Judge Kaye argued, was
based on an artificial rule that would eventually lead to far reach-
ing liability.' The dissent maintained that public policy de-
manded the denial of bystander claims. 00
It is suggested that, although the abandonment of the absolute
bar to bystander recovery is a step in the right direction, the Court
should have extended protection to all foreseeable bystanders
whether or not they are within the zone of danger. It is further
suggested that maintaining that a negligent defendant owes no
plaintiff was denied damages for emotional and physical injuries suffered as a result of giv-
ing birth to a baby suffering from Down's Syndrome. Id. at 406, 386 N.E.2d at 809, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 897. The Court contended that, had the defendant's doctor warned the mother
of the existence of the abnormality (detectable by an amniocentesis test), the pregnancy
would have been terminated, id. at 408, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898, yet held
that denial of recovery was necessitated because to allow recovery would lead to "artificial
and arbitrary boundaries." Id. at 413 -14, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902; see also
Howard v. Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 113, 366 N.E.2d 64, 66, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363, 365-66 (1977)
(parents of a child born suffering from Tay-Sachs disease denied recovery for emotional
injuries caused by watching their child suffer).
.. 61 N.Y.2d at 233, 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364. The Court declared this
decision constituted merely an enlargement of the scope of damages already available under
an existing cause of action. Id.
"I Judge Kaye dissented in an opinion in which Judges Wachtler and Simons con-
curred. Judge Wachtler also wrote a separate dissenting memorandum.
61 N.Y.2d at 234, 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
Judge Kaye believed that the majority had sidestepped the issue by suggesting that it was
neither creating a new duty nor overruling prior decisions simply because a different set of
facts were presented. Id. at 234-35, 461 N.E.2d at 851, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (Kaye, J., dis-
senting). The real issue, Judge Kaye maintained, was whether recovery for all emotional
trauma resulting from injuries to others should have a legal remedy. Id. at 235, 461 N.E.2d
at 851, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 365 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 241, 461 N.E.2d at 854, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Kaye, J., dissenting). Taking no
solace in the majority's view that the dearth of appellate opinions was a significant indica-
tion of the limited number of recoveries expected, id. at 229 n.7, 461 N.E.2d at 847 n.7, 473
N.Y.S.2d at 361 n.7, Judge Kaye noted that there is a large amount of litigation that stops
short of appellate review and added that it was the practice of insurance carriers to pass the
added costs of litigation on to consumers. Id. at 241, 461 N.E.2d at 855, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 369
(Kaye, J., dissenting). It should be noted that these are the same concerns that were articu-
lated in Tobin v. Grossman approximately 15 years earlier. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24
N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 559-60 (1969).
"' 61 N.Y.2d at 234, 461 N.E.2d at 850, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 364 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
200 Id. at 237, 461 N.E.2d at 852, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
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duty to a bystander outside some objective zone of danger is no
more than an arbitrary and artificial cut-off of liability201 based on
the unwarranted fear that an avalanche of claims 202and unlimited
liability will result.20 3 It is submitted that, as a matter of public
201 Various commentators have denounced the artificiality of the zone of danger rule.
See, e.g., J. FLEMING, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw OF TORTS 50-54 (1967); W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 173, § 55 at 334 (rule is illogical); Brody, Negligently Inflicted
Psychic Injuries: A Return to Reason, 7 VILL. L. REv. 232, 238-39 (1961) (mechanical and
irrelevant rule).
Judge Kaye noted that the zone of danger rule has also been criticized in other jurisdic-
tions. 61 N.Y.2d at 242, 461 N.E.2d at 856, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (citing
Barnhill v. Davis, 300 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981); Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555,
564, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 (1978); Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 96, 417 A.2d 521, 525 (1980)).
The arbitrariness of the zone of danger rule can best be illustrated by the facts of the
leading case rejecting the rule. See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 72 (1968). In Dillon, the court was asked whether a mother several feet outside the
zone of danger and a daughter within it could recover for psychic injury caused by observing
the injury of another family member. Id. at 730, 441 P.2d at 914, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 74. To
allow the sister to recover while at the same time denying the mother's claim, the court
stated, exposed the "hopeless artificiality" of the zone of danger rule. Id. at 732, 441 P.2d at
915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 75. The California Supreme Court also suggested that it was logically
indefensible to rely upon the zone of danger rule while rejecting the impact rule. Accord 68
Cal. 2d at 733, 441 P.2d at 915, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 57. See Rodriguez v. State, 52 Haw. 156,
166, 472 P.2d 509, 518-21 (1970) (psychic zone of danger is necessarily larger than the zone
of physical danger); see, e.g., Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 653, 207 N.W.2d 140,
144 (1973). By recognizing an emotional impact zone, the Court can break through the duty
barrier created by Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928).
See Comment, supra note 176, at 215.
2'2 See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 173, § 172, at 23. Courts often fear a
flood of litigation when they are on the verge of extending existing legal theory. Id. This has
been particularly true in the field of recovery for emotional trauma. See, e.g., Tobin v.
Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 615, 249 N.E.2d 419, 422, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554, 558 (1969). Indeed,
the New York Court of Appeals expressed such a fear when considering whether to allow
claims for nervous shock without physical injury. See Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y.
107, 110, 45 N.E. 354, 354 (1896); Simons, Psychic Injury and the Bystander: The Trans-
continental Dispute Between California and New York, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 12-13
(1976). It is submitted that the fear of overwhelming litigation in the Bovsun setting is as
unreal as it was when used in defense of the privity doctrine in products liability: "Unless
we confine the operation of such contracts as to the parties who entered them, the most
absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would ensue." Winterbot-
tom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 114, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 405 (1842).
203 See Kennedy v. McKesson Co., 58 N.Y.2d 500, 512, 448 N.E.2d 1332, 1338, 462
N.Y.S.2d 411, 427 (1983) (Jasen, J., dissenting). The fear of unlimited liability has been
raised against every innovation in tort litigation, see id.; see also Stone, Louisiana Tort
Doctrine: Emotional Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 TuL. L. REv. 782, 791
(1974) (courts fear opening Pandora's box), and has been the main factor in causing a ma-
jority of jurisdictions to reject claims of bystanders outside the zone of danger, see Com-
ment, Grimsby v. Samson: Bystander Recovery in Washington, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 196,
201-02 (1975). The New York Court of Appeals, in Tobin, stated that the most difficult
factor in allowing recovery to bystander witnesses is keeping liability within tolerable
bounds. See Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 617, 249 N.E.2d 419, 423, 301 N.Y.S.2d 554,
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policy, recovery should not be denied when there has been an
injury.20 4
. The basic objective of tort law is to afford compensation for
injuries sustained.2"5 It is therefore suggested that a foreseeability
approach is preferable to the zone of danger rule. Many jurisdic-
tions have already adopted such an approach20 6 and determine the
foreseeability of injury with reference to three factors: first,
whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident;
second, whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact
upon the plaintiff from a contemporaneous perception of the acci-
dent or from learning of the accident from others; and, third,
whether the victim and the plaintiff were closely related.0 7 The
560 (1969).
204 In discussing public policy and how it relates to tortfeasor liability it has been noted
that public policy finds expression through the "talisman of duty." W. PROSSER & W. KEE-
TON, supra note 173, § 53, at 326-27. "The question of duty . . . is best expressed as
'whether the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's con-
duct.'" Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781, 782, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393, 395
(1976) (quoting W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 173, § 53, at 325). When phrased this
way, it is clear that by denying the existence of a duty the Court is really denying its protec-
tion to genuine human interests that can therefore be infringed with impunity. See J. FLEM-
ING, supra note 201, at 46.
205 W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 173, § 1, at 5-6; see also Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa.
146, 155, 404 A.2d 672, 677 (1979).
208 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 740
(1968) (first jurisdiction adopting foreseeability approach). In rejecting the zone of danger
rule, the Dillon Court reasoned that the defendant's duty should be determined according
to the foreseeability of the risk to the plaintiff. Id. at 738, 441 P.2d at 919-21, 925, 69 Cal.
Rptr. at 79-81. Contrary to the concerns expressed by the Bovsun court, Dillon has not led
to a deluge of false claims, a flood of litigation, or unlimited liability. See Lafferty v. Man-
hasset Medical Center Hosp., 103 Misc. 2d 98, 103, 425 N.Y.S.2d 244, 247 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1980), rev'd, 79 App. Div. 2d 996, 435 N.Y.S.2d 307 (2d Dep't), afl'd, 54 N.Y.2d 277,
429 N.E.2d 789, 445 N.Y.S.2d 111 (1981); Simons, supra note 202, at 39. From 1968 to 1981,
eight other jurisdictions adopted the Dillon approach, Comment, supra note 189, at 1176,
and today, a total of fourteen jurisdictions have done so, Bovsun, 61 N.Y.2d at 227 n.4, 461
N.E.2d at 846 n.4, 473 N.Y.S.2d at 360 n.4. Commentators have noted that Dillon represents
the modern trend. See, e.g., Comment, Torts-Mental Distress-Liability for Negligently
Inflicted Mental Distress Extended to Apply to Mother Who Witnesses Death of Her
Child, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1252, 1254 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Torts-Mental Distress].
Indeed, in England, far from adopting the restrictive approach followed by Bovsun, courts
employ an analysis that is even broader than that used in Dillon. See, e.g., Boardman v.
Sanderson [1964] 1 W.L.R. 1317, 1321; see also Simons, supra note 202, at 17-22.
'07 Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 740-41, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 80 (1968).
The Dillon court believed that the three factor test it enunciated could be used to deter-
mine the foreseeability of the injury to the plaintiff. Id. The three elements were first sug-
gested by Dean Prosser. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 173, § 55, at 335. Since then
they have been adopted by many jurisdictions. See, e.g., D'Amicol v. Alvarez Shipping Co.,
31 Conn. Sup. 164, 167, 326 A.2d 129, 131 (1973); Culbert v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444
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jurisdictions that have adopted a foreseeability approach have con-
sidered and rejected the arguments advanced by the Bovsun
Court.20 8 By applying these guidelines on a case-by-case basis,
courts can free themselves of the mechanical rules imposed by a
strict physical zone of danger rule and determine what the ordi-
nary prudent person under the circumstances should reasonably
have foreseen.0 9
In Bovsun, New York has moved closer to an equitable process
of ascertaining liability. It is submitted, however, that implement-
ing a traditional foreseeability analysis in this area will better serve
the courts than will the creation of another set of artificial
exceptions.
Christopher Nenninger
A.2d 433, 435 (Me. 1982); Landreth v. Reed, 570 S.W.2d 486, 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
2"' See, e.g., Rodrigues v. State, 52 Haw. 156, 172, 472 P.2d 509, 519-20 (1970); Culbert
v. Sampson's Supermarkets, 444 A.2d 433, 436-37 (Me. 1982); Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146,
160, 404 A.2d 672, 679-80 (1979).
209 See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 741, 441 P.2d 912, 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81
(1968); Torts-Mental Distress, supra note 34, at 1253.
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